When each of n judges ranks a set A of m objects from best to worst, and s= (~1, . . . ,sm) is a decreasing sequence of real numbers, the collective ranking determined by s orders the objects in A according to their total scores. The total score of x equals sp times the number of judges w'ho rank x in pth place, summed over p.
I. Introduction
Suppose each of n judges ranks a set A of HJ objects from best to worst, resulting in a list R=(al,..., nn) of asymmetric linear orders on A. For each a E A, let nap be the number of terms (judges) in n that rank object a in pth place, and let w(a) = (&lr . . . s n,), with Cp nap --n. Given an m-dimensional real vector s, the score of ad under s operating on R is the inner product so n(a), and S(Z) is the binary relation on A defined by
as(lr)b iff s+a)>sw(b).
The relation s(n) can be thought of as a collective ranking with ties allowed, as deternlined by the score vector s = (SI, . . . , sm) operating on theprofile 71 = (XI, . . . , nn) of linear orders on A. Clearly, if cy > 0 and /? are real numbers, and as + fl is defined as (ccsl +jY, l , asm+j3) , then s(n)=(crs+fl)(~). Becau<:e of this and the fact that I shall work only with monotone decreasing score vectors, we shall normalize by letting and work henceforth with this set of score vectors for each m ~2. I shall also let n(A) denote the set of all nonempty finite lists (profiles) of linear orders on :4.
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When A = {al, . . . , am}, a linear order with ai in first place, aj in second place, l . . , and a& in last place will be written as aiaj l *. a&. Thus, ni= ala2 l ** am indicates that judge i ranks a1 first, a2 second, and so forth. When s(n) =.auz2 l *a am, the collective ranking S(X) is the linear order a1 . ..am with no ties; i.e., a$(z)ai+~ for i= 1,2 ,..., m-1.
Collective ranking procedures date at least from Borda [l, 31, who proposed the sum-of-rahrks score vector, which in terms of Sm is (m -1, m -2, l m* 9 1,O). Borda's pro&ure has been recently axiomatized [S, 13,' 151 and noted to possess several important properties, some of which will be mentioned later. Other recent axiomatizations of positional scoring rules for determiniilg a collective ranking or a subset of "best" objects [4, 9, 14, 16, 171 have rekindled interest in these procedures.
The present paper has two main purposes. The first is to prove that if s,s'E Sm and s+s', which requires m z 3, then there is a profile n in H({al, . . . , am}) s'(Ic)=~~ l azal. Thus, not only can different s and s' in Sm reverse the collective ranking between two objects in A = {al, . . . , am}, but they can reverse <the collective ranking between all pairs of objects.
The second purpose is to consider reversals in the collective ranking produced by SE Sm when a prespecified object is removed from every order in A and a score vector t E S m -1 is applied to the modified profile. We shall use a simple constructive proof to show that, given any mr3 with A={a1, . . . ,am}, and given any kE(l,..., m}, SE& and teS m-1, there is a it en(A) for which s(7c) =a1a2~~~ a,% and t(n with a& removed) = am ..* a&+ la&-. 1 l al. A detailed analysis for m = 3 shows that the number of k for which a single n can produce a reversal on removal of a& depends on s: in particula,r, ifs is not the Borda score vector in S3, then there is a II E U({al, a2, a3)) for which s(n) = aItiza3 and for which t = (1,0) ranks a2 before a1 when a3 is removed, ranks a3 before al when a2 is removed, and ranks a3 before a2 when al is removed. However, when s is the Borda vector in S3, this is impossible.
The latter purpose is related to several recent studies, all of which are based on Borda vectors or the sum-of-ranks procedure. Davidson and Odeh [2] develop conditions for profiles on A under which the second-ranked object in A is not ranked first in ,.4 \ (x} after the initial first-ranked object XE A is removed from the profiles. Fishburn [8] proves for each m 2 3 that there is a n E n(A) with x ranked first such that x does not rank or tie for first in any proper subset B of A which contains x und at least one other object, except for one such subset with two elements. And Fishburn [7] shows that there are profiles that yield a linear Borda ranking on A such that, when either the first-place or last-place object in the Borda ranking is removed, the new Borda ranking on the remaining objects is inverted or reversed. He did not prove, however, that both reversals can result from the same II, which is an immediate corollary of Theorem 2 in the present paper.
Although constructive proofs are often preferred for the types of results noted here, I shall rely on several indirect proofs because of their efficiency. The latter proofs will be based on the following linear separation oi duality lemma, often referred to as a version of the Theorem of The Alternative [a] . 
i=l
The two alternatives in the lemma are mutually exclusive. Moreover, it should be clear that the first holds if and only if it is true for some q that is composed entirely of positive integers. The latter fact will be used to establish the existence of certain profiles.
Inversions with no removals
As noted above, our first purpose will be to prove where bk equals s; -s6 when object ai occupies position p and ai+ 1 occupies position q in the kth linear order. It follows from Lemma 1 that the combined system of 2(m -1) strict inequalities has no q solution that corresponds to some profile R if and only if there are nonnegative real numbers al, . . . , am-t,jR, ,-. , pm--I (associated with the inequalities in the order listed above), at least one of which is positive, such that ~'q,a~+m~1#3,&~0 fork=l,...,m!.
p=t p=I
Given s#ss' with a,~0 and&-'0 for all p, we sh:;911 prove that this alternative system of m ! nonstrict inequalities is consistent iff' Q = &, = 0 for p = 1, . . . , m -1. Since this violates the condition that some CY,, or /JP is to be strictly positive, it follows that there isanEn(A)forwhichs(~)=al~~~amands'(~)=am~~~alwhenm~3ands#sr. AsstJme henceforth in this proof that ~3:s' and that the foregoing system of nonstrict inequalities is valid with a+0 and &r 0 for all p. Since all m! linear orders are used in our formulation, C k a f = xk bf = 0 for each p, so that, when the left hand sides of the preceding system are summed over ks we get 
icm-1 I
When the second of these is subtracted from the first, we get a Jm =B Jm, or a J = BJ. Suppose a J = /9J > 0. Then succeeding differences between p-adjacent equalities for al and /31 give sr -s~=s'~ -4, SZ-SJ=S$-sj, . . . ,sm-2-1 =sL_~-1, where l=Sm-l=S~_1. But then, working backwards through these differences, we get s = s', a contradiction. Hence a J = BJ = 0.
To prove that a2 = /?2 = 0, we let 1~~ be the set of all linear orders on A that have 472 in position p. The proof then proceeds exactly as in the preceding paragraph, except that in summing over k E r2, to get the set of m equalities between a2 and /%, the al and #31 terms vanish not because CI, a: = C I,b: = 0 but because fit1 = PI = 0. The m equalities between a2 and 82 are the same as the (a J$J) equalities, except that a2 and /#2 replace a J and flJ, so we conclude from this step that a2=/?2= 0.
The proof then proceeds in the indicated manner through successive (aP,j!3P) pairs and shows that aP=&,=Oforp= l,...,m-1. 0
Inversions with one removal
We shall prove next a general inversion theorem which involves the remova{ of one object in A = {al, . . . . am} from a profile n en(A). To supplement previous notation, we shall let n \ a'denote the profile in l7(A \ {a}) that is obtained from II E n(A) after object a is removed from every term in 71. Given s(n) = al l *. am, Theorem 2 shows that we can get an inversion with the same n when either al or am is removed -which strengthens the Borda inversion result in [7] , but that different n's may be needed for intermediate f%. We shall consider this further in the next section for m = 3 after stating an easy corollary of Theorem 2.
Although the proof of Theorem 2 does not depend on special features of s and t other than monotonicity, the M values needed to produce the inversions generally depend on the spacing between the ti values. In particular, it is easily seen that M is "sufficiently large" in each instance iff
M(tj-tj-I)>(tm-I-j-tm-j)
forj=l,...,m-2.
(*)
Let Sm-I(M) be the set of all I E Sm-I for which (*) holds. 
Detailed results for m = 3
It is natural to ask whether some profile can yield inversions on A \ {ak} for combinations of uk not covered by Theorem 2. Altho71gh such questions will be left open for general m, our next theorem shows the full extent of inversions with the removal of one object when m = 3. 3 with A = {al, a2, a3) . If SE S3 and sl # 2, then there is a it EII(A) for which s(n) = ala2a3, t(a \ al) = a3a2, t(n \ a2) = a3al and t(z \ a3) = a2al. However, if SE& and s1=2, then no n EJ;((A) with s(z) =alaza3 has both t(lr \ al) =a342 and t(z \ a2) =asai, and no n E l&4) with s(a) =a~aza~ has both t(a \ a2) =asal and t(n \ as) =azal.
Theorem 3. Let (A( =
Remark* s1 = 2 identifies the Borda vector in Sj. Hence all possible inversion combinations for Borda with m=3 are covered by Theorem 2. However, as Theorem 3 asserts, ifs is any other vector in $3, then some 7t with s(z) = ala2a3 has a3 beating both al and a2 by simple majorities, and also has a2 beating at by a simple majority. Other special features of Borda score vectors will be noted after we prove Theorem 3. with rf=(nl,..., n6). Then als(z)az, a&r)a3, t(n \ al) = a3a2, t(n \ az) = a3al and t(z \ a$ = a2a1 are respectively equivalent to the following five inequalities: -n +r2(l -A)+r3+r4+r5sO.
We show first that this system is consistent only if il = 2, thus proving the st +2 part of Theorem 2. Addition of the third and fifth inequalities gives rl(2 -i1)~0, which requires rr =O if 2>L Suppose 2 >A and the system is consistent. Then addition of the first and last inequalities gives r2(2 -A) ~0, hence r2= 0. But then rl = r2 = 0 requires r3 = r4 = rs = 0 in thti final inequality, so that no ri> 0. In a similar manner, addition of the second and fourth ri inequalities gives r2(A -2)10, which requires rt = 0 if A > 2. Suppose A. >2 and the system is consistent. With r2=0, addition of the first and last inequalities gives rl(jl -2) SO, hence rt = 0, so again the final inequality requires r3 = r4 = r5 = 0. Now consider sr = A = 2. Then one specific instance of consistency for the ri system is (0, . . . , r5) = (2,4,3,3,0) . Since r5 =O, this means that there is no nonnegative q solution to the first four inequalities in the 0 system, which mean that no R with ~(75) =alc12a3 can yield both a3t(n \ al)a2 and aJt(n \ az)al. Another ri solution is (49 2,0,3,3), which with r3 = 0 means that there is no nonnegative q solution to that system when its third inequality is deleted. Hence no n with s(n) = ala2a3 can yield both a$(tr \ a2)al and azt(n \ aj)al. III Theorem 3 identifies a sense in which the Borda score vector is the vector in S3 that is most resistant to inversions in the collective ranking when one object is removed. Previous research has singled out the Borda vector as unique in other ways. I shall mention four such results here. Several others are noted in [IO, 121. We shall say that II E II(A) has a majority object x iff, for every y E A \ {x}, more terms in n rank x ahead of y than rank y ahead of x. A proof of the first result is given in [14] . It bears obvious similarities to Theorem 3, Result 1. Suppose m 2 3 and IA) = m. Ifs is the Borda vector in Sm, then for every n E I7(A ) that Las a majority object x, there is some y E A for which xs(~)y. Ifs E Sm is not the Borda vector, then there is a n E R(A) with majority object x such that ys(n)xfor allyeA \ {x}.
For the second result, we take m = 3 and let s = (A, 1, 09, with A > 1, as in the proof Thus, in the limit as n-o, the Borda vector in S3 maximizes coincidence between the majority object and the s(n) winner, given that a majority object exists.
Our third result is also based on n-o. It applies to either m = 3 or m = 4 and is provedin [12] . FormE{3,4}, takeA={at,...,am}.
Let y&i,j)forsESmandi<j in {IA . . . , m} be the number of n-term profiles in 27(A) for which s(n) = ala2 l am and for which ai has a strict simple majority over aj, divided by the number of nterm profiles in n(A) for which s(n) =ala2 l a-am. Then let ~(8, i, j) be the limiting value of y&, i, j) as n+ 00. Result 3 shows that, for m E { 3,4}, the Borda vector maximizes the likelihood (as measured by limit ratios) that the majority relation between any two objects in -4 will be the same as its relation in s(a).
Our final result extends this non-reversal result to the removal of one object from A = {al, a2, a3, as}. It is the only result mentioned in this section that does not directly involve the majority relation. Given (s, t) E SIX S3, let B= {al,az,aJ}, and let ~(s, t, B) be the limit as n +oo of the number of n-term profiles in Z?(A) whose t(lt \ ~4) ranking on B is the same as the ranking on B induced by S(X) on A = {al, 42, a3, ad}, divided by the number of n-term profiles in n(A). There is no restriction here on the S(R) ranking. For example, it could be a3a4ala2, in which case its induced ranking on B is ujala2; we have agreement between this induced ranking and the t(n \ 04) ranking iff the latter is also a3ala2. The following is part of Theorem 3 in [12] .
Result 4. p(s, t, B) is uniquely maximized over (s, t) E S4 x S3 when s is the Borda vector in S4 and t is the Borda vector in S3.
